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INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRYt
STEVEN L. WILI,BORN*
Industrial democracy is a central promise of the National Labor Relations Act.
(NLRA). 1
 The Act, drawing from lessons learned in the political sphere, provides a
quasi-democratic procedure for governance of the work place. Representatives are
elected. Rules are established by the representatives, Disputes are adjudicated according
to the rules. This model of the NLRA — as a charter of industrial democracy — supplies
much of the allure of labor law as an academic discipline. Labor law as a representative
democracy promises the same rewards and confronts the same probleins as its parent and
archetype, liberal democracy.
The idea of industrial democracy first gained momentum in the rhetoric of the union
movement. In 1918, the American Federation of Labor argued that "workers should have
a voice in determining the laws within industry and commerce which affect them,
equivalent to the voice which they have as citizens in determining the legislative enact-
ments which shall govern them."- The idea then entered the realm of political rhetoric
and provided supporters of the Act with an ideological basis for their proposal. Senator
Wagner, chief sponser of the Wagner Act, 3
 said that "[t]he principles of Ethel proposal
were . . . that we must have democracy in industry as well as in government; that
democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work in the decisions vitally
affecting their lives and livelihood; and that . . workers . . can enjoy this participation
only if allowed to .. bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." 4
Later, influential commentators used the notion of industrial democracy to change public
perception of the Act front an impression that the Act was a largely unwelcome gov-
-[ Copyright © 1984 Boston College Law School.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. The author would like to
thank Gregory M. Bentz for his research assistance,
' National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as "the Act,"
"the NLRA," or "the National Labor Relations Act"I.
2
 M. DF.RBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1865-1965 165 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter cited as M. DERBERI. See generally H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND TELE LEGAL. PROCESS 26-27 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as H. WELLINGTON].
3 Wagner Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), is the original ancestor of the current
National Labor Relations Act.
4 New York Times, April 13, 1937, at 20, col. 1. Foi- a similar statement by Senator Wagner in a
more formai setting, see 75 CoNG. REC. 4918 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 1932).
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ernmental intrusion into the view that the Act established a system of democratic norms
forming an integral part of the industrial milieu. For example, Professor Cox noted in
1948 that the oust important measure of the value of collective bargaining in its gov-
ernmental aspect was the degree of democracy it introduced into industrial life. Collective
bargaining, he stated, aimed to establish a rule of law and enable the individual employee
to share in industrial government .' Industrial democracy, then, is the ideology of the
American labor relations system; it is the ideology of the NLRA. 5
Despite an illustrious history? industrial democracy under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is largely a myth. The Act has failed to fulfill its promise.' This article will first
trace the notion of industrial democracy from its origins to the Wagner Act to its
development under current labor laws. Next the article will analyze the quasi-democracy
created by the National Labor Relations Act. The manner in which the Act answers the
essential questions of democratic theory — questions such as who votes, how votes are
weighed, and what limitations are Unposed on outcomes — will then be described and
criticized. Finally, the article will discuss the effects of viewing labor relations through this
lens.
1. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY — A BRIEF HISTORY
"The democratic principle on which this nation was founded should not be
restricted to the political process but should he applied to the industrial
operation as well."9
Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison, made this statement upon the introduction of a profit sharing plan into his
factory in 1797. 1° The idea of industrial democracy, then, arose with the rise of industry."
This idea became even more embedded, especially in the minds of workers, when it
became apparent that "wage earning was [not] a mere way station to independence as
farmer, artisan or entrepreneur."" The creation of a permanent, economically depen-
dent class heightened awareness, both inside and outside the class, of the importance and
' Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 2), 61 HARV. L. REV. 274, 276
(1948)[hereinafter cited as Cox, LMRA (pt. 2)]; See also Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947 (pt. 1), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Cox, LMRA (pt. 1)1.
• Professor Dunlop has defined the ideology of an industrial-relations system as "a set of ideas
and beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to bind or to integrate the system together as an
entity." J. Dum,op, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYsTEm (1958) [hereinafter cited as J. Dum.op].
• See infra notes 9-50 and accompanying text.
H This article reaches this conclusion analytically by comparing the concept of democracy to the
realities of the NLRA processes. Other scholars have reached similar conclusions through other types
of analysis. See, e.g., Blare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal
Consciousness, 1937 - 1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Klare], Stone, The
Post- War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Stone];
Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CI.EV.	 I,. REV. 29 (1979). cf. Hyde,
Detnnerary in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984) [hereinafte• cited as Hyde].
• M. DERRER, supra note 2, at 6.
u'
" Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. Rev. 286, 339 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gorman & Finkin]. See also I).
RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1850-1920, 57 (1974); F. TANNENBAUM, A
PHILOSOPHY or LABOR 9 (1951).
" See generally M. DERBER, supra note 2, at 6-12, 29-107; Gorman & Finkin, supra note 11, at
339-41.
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rewards of industrial democracy. Records from inside the class arc sketchy, because
members did not have ready access to the press and historians have largely ignored their
views, but recent research indicates a yearning for democratic control that extended well
beyond the traditional modes.' 3
 From the perspective of those outside the class, the new
laboring class threatened not only industry, but the larger democracy as well.'' Contem-
porary commentators recognized that the contradiction between general political liberty
and industrial slavery could not. coexist for very long and predicted that political liberty
would be extinguished or industrial liberty would be restored.''
Quite different branches could be grafted onto this emerging-
 trunk of industrial
democracy. The statement of Albert Gallatin quoted at the beginning of this section was
made upon the introduction of a profit sharing plan, and other employers shared his view
that profit sharing was a respectable offshoot of industrial democracy.'" There were.
however, many other respectable offshoots of industrial democracy such as employer-
sponsored employee representation plans, public ownership of business, scientific man-
agement, and, of course, collective bargaining. 17 All of these variants of industrial democ-
racy share two common characteristics: a weakening of autocratic employer control of the
work place and a concomitant increase in the participation of employees or the public or
both in industrial decisionmaking.
By the time of the Wagner Act. however, collective bargaining had emerged from
among these variants to become the standard bearer of industrial democracy. Industrial
democracy now meant collective bargaining between employers and representatives cho-
sen by employees. Senator Wagner championed the cause stating that democracy in
industry must be based upon the same principles as democracy in government.'' He
maintained that "Etniajority rule, with all its imperfections, is the best. protection of
workers' rights, just. as it is the surest guaranty of' political liberty that mankind has yet
discovered..." Senator Wagner was joined by a chorus of other voices. Representative
Mead proclaimed that the NLRA created a democracy within industry that gave industrial
workers the same general idea of freedom the founding fathers conferred upon citizens
of the United States" and Representative Truax, with some overstatement, declared that
the Wagner-Connery bill, the precursor to the Wagner Act, freed the industrial slaves of
this country from the tyranny and aggression of the overlords of wealth, just as Lincoln
had freed the blacks in the South. 21
 Thus, collective bargaining and, specifically, collective
bargaining under the NLRA model became the embodiment of industrial democracy.
But the model of democracy under the Wagner Act was only a seed. The model did
not come into full flower until it was articulated by Archibald Cox and other, post-war
liberals.'" These post-war liberals wrote extensively" and presented the model in its
`3 }Clare, supra note 8, at 290-91 & mi. 78-79.
" Gorman & Finkin, supra note 11, at 340 & 11.203.
L. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE or BIGNESS 39 (1934), cited in, Gorman & Finkin, supra note 11, at
340-41.
1 ° M. DERRER, supra none 2, an 7, 9, 62-65, 130, 483-85.
" See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 11, at 341; M. DERRER,SUP1 note 2, at 130; Guzda, Industrial
Democracy: Made in the U.S.A., 107 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (1984).
' 8 79 CONG. REC. 87571 (daily ed. May 15, 1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
ig Id.
2° 79 CoNo. Ric. 119710 (daily ed. June 19, 1935) (statement of Rep. 8.1ead).
79 CONG. REC. H9714 (daily ed. June 19, 1935) (statement of Rep. Truax).
22
 Professor Cox and a number of other intellectuals shared, and indeed molded, the model of
the NLRA described in this article. See infra notes 25-29, 33, 41, 48-49, 52-53 and accompanying text.
Other significant architects of the model were Benjamin Aaron, a law professor and arbitrator; Neil
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clearest and most unified form, They had a significant influence on the development of
American labor law, evidenced by the reliance placed upon their writings by the courts."
Collective bargaining in the workplace as a self-contained representative democracy
is the central metaphor of the model as articulated by the post-war liberals:25 Representa-
tives of management and labor meet to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement which
becomes the basic statute governing the conduct of industrial relations wit hits the plant. 26
Disputes over the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement are resolved through
arbitration and, hence, private arbitration serves as the judiciary in this democracy.'? To
ensure the proper functioning of this mini-democracy, the processes of the state -
primarily the courts, but also to a lesser extent the legislature - should not interveneC 4 '
the workplace as representative democracy is "an island of self-rule whose self-regulating
Chamberlain, a Harvard economist; John Dunlop, a Harvard professor and former Secretary of
Labor: David Feller, a professor of law; and Harry Shulman, an arbitrator and former Dean of the
Yale Law School. See Stone, supra note 8, at 1516 n.29.
" Professor Cox alone, for example, had 42 articles on labor law listed in the Index to Legal
Periodicals from 1944 to 1980, 11 of which appeared in the widely-read and influential Harvard Law
Review. During this time, he also authored or co-authored a number of books. See, e.g., A. Cox, D.
Box & R. GoRmAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw (8th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as A. Cox,
D. BOK & R. GORMAN]: A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL. LABOR POLICS' (1960) [hereinafter cited as A.
Cox].
24 Using Professor Cox as an example once again, his articles were cited in at least 47 labor cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court between 1950 and 1983. (I do not warrant that my
computer search was exhaustive). The cases include a virtual Hall of Fame of labor law cases. E.g.,
Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 623 (1975); National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NI.RB, 386 U.S. 612, 62611.16 (1967); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967); N I.RB v. C. &
C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 430 (1967); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 568 n.6 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 n.6
(1960); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 458 (1957); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB. 350 U.S. 270, 295 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395, 405 n.16 (1952).
25 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 - 81 (1960) ("A
collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial self-government"); Steel v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). See, Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union
Democracy, 72 MARV. L. REV. 609, 610 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Preserving Union Democracy];
Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1958); Cox,
LMRA (pt. I), supra note 5, at 1; Cox, LMRA (pt. 2), supra note 5, at 275.
" Cox, LIMA (pt. 2),supra note 5, in 275. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-80 (1960); Steel v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., '323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944);
Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1982, 1492 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Cox,
Reflections]. See generally Stone, supra note 8.
27 Cox, Reflections „Ci4Pra note 26, at 1506; Cox, Current Problems in the Low of Grievance Arbitration,
30 ROCKY MTN. 1- REV. 247, 263 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Current Problems]; Feller, Arbitra-
tion: The Days of Its' Glory are Numbered, 2 INnus, REL. L.J. 97, 101-02 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Feller]; Leiserson, Constitutional Government in American Industries, 12 Am. ECON. REV. 56, 63 (1922);
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations. 68 HARV. 1... Rev. 999, 1007, 1024 . (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Shulman], See Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of
Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450, 963 (1981) thereinafter cited as Klare, Historiog-
raphy]; Stone, .5upre, note 8, at 1514-15.
Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. I.J. 319. 322 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Cox, Concerted Activities]; Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARV. 1.. REV. 389, 425-32 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Cox & Dunlop]; Shulman,
supra note 27, at 1024: Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CAL. L. Rev.
663, 771-72 (1973).
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mechanisms must not be disrupted by judicial intervention or other Scrutiny by outsid-
ers, -
The National Labor Relations Act serves as the constitution in this mini-democracy.
It provides the basic organizational structure for the democracy and contains certain basic
"civil" rights." The National Labor Relations Board is empowered to designate appropri-
ate election units,'' to hold hearings, anti to conduct representation elections.' 2 Thus, the
Act "set[s] up machinery for periodically determining the union designated as their
representative by a majority of the employees." 3" it thus provides for the democratic
selection of a major participant in the mini-democracy, the employee representative. In
addition, the Board is empowered to enforce rights and restrictions established by the
Act," including the employer's duty "to bargain collectively" with employee representa-
tives.'
The rights and restrictions established by the Act, however, pose a threat to the
NLRA model articulated by Professor Cox and others. These rights and restrictions
invade the "island of self-rule"; instead of a self-contained democracy, the Board and the
courts interfere with decisions reached by the democratic process." For example. • section
8(a)(3) of the Act, makes it illegal for an employer to treat an employee differently
because of the employee's union membership or non-membership. 37
 Even if the differen-
tial treatment is a result of the preferred process (collective bargaining)," it is illegal.'"
Section 8(a)(3), then, is a limit out democratic outcomes. The section threatens the claim
that the Act is a self-contained democracy because the processes of the state intervene to
alter substantive outcomes.
Champions of the NRLA model met this challenge by characterizing the Act's rights
and restrictions as instrumental or, to borrow a term from political theory, as
Sit Stone, supra note 8, at 1515. See alto, P. SEr.zsacx, LAW, SOCWTY, ANTI INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE
151-58, 178-82 (1969); Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L. Q. 592, 606 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Cox, The Role of the Lau)] (the NLRA should "encourage private democracy"),
" This model of the N LRA mirrors the model of the United States Constitution finwarded
some commentators, most notably John Hart Ely. See Ecr , rt..-EMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY
OF Juoscam. REVIEW 88-101 (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. Et.v]l. See also' Fuller, America)! Legal
Philosophy at Mid-Century. 6 J. LEG. Eocc, 457, 463-67 (1954); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
NE11. L. lbw. 197, 254-55 (1975).
3 ' NLRA, § 9(b). 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976).
32
 N t,RA, § 9(c), 29 us.C. § 159(c) (1976).
' Cox & Dunlop, supra lime 28, at 389.
• NLRA, § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
• N LRA, § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(x)(5) (1076).
In a similar fashion, the substantive provisions of the United States Constitution threaten the
process-oriented interpretation of sonic commentators. This threat is met in much 'he same way that
the threat to the NLRA model is inet. The Constitution is "overwhelmingly" dedicated to process
concerns, but it is not exclusively so dedicated, J. E4v,.supra note 30, at 92, and, moreover, many of
the seemingly sultstantive provisions were actually "centrally intended to help make our governmen-
tal processes work." Id. at 93-94. See, id. at 88- 101.
37
 NLRA, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(x)(3) (1976).
• For the moment, t am ignoring the issue of whether rights are waivable. The right to strike
guaranteed by the Act, for example, can be waived through the collective bargaining process. See
infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
39 The closed shop is a common.example. A closed shop provision, or even a lesser provision
that conflicts with the requirements of section 8(x)(3), is illegal even if it was -agreed upon in the
collective bargaining process. See, e.g. • Operating Engineers, Local 542 (Elmhurst Coin acting Co.),
141 N.L.R.B. 53, 53-55 (1963), enforced, 329 F.2(1 512 (3rd Cir. 1964); Billings Local No. 1172
(Refinery Engineering Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 307, 307 (1961).
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representation-reinforcing:" } The right to be tree from discrimination on the basis of
union membership or non-membership is protected because it is necessary to the demo-
cratic procedures established by the Act." This limited intrusion on substantive outcomes
is required to ensure the proper functioning of the mini-democracy; in the case of Section
8(a)(3), to ensure that employees can choose their representative free of employer coer-
cicm. 42 The rights and restrictions, then, are not designed to further intrinsic or funda-
mental values,1" but rather to further the collective bargaining process.
The ability of unions to waive some, but not all, employee rights is a logical extension
of this instrumentalist interpretation of the Act's rights and restrictions. Unions, for
example, can waive the right to engage in an economic strike;" but cannot waive the right.
to engage in in-plant leaflet ting.15 The Supreme Court has distinguished between waiva-
ble and non-waivable rights by analyzing the importance of the rights in question to the
procedures established by the Act. Thus, in-plant leafieuing is not waivable because it is a
mechanism for facilitating the selection of it bargaining representative (a critical process
under the Act), while the right to strike is waivable because it is merely a tie-breaking
mechanism (a less critical process under the Act.):'" The Act, then, does not contain rights
and restrictions for their intrinsic value or they would uniformly be unwaivable:" Rather,
the rights and restrictions may or may not be waivable depending on their instrumental
value to the essential processes of the Act.'"
-") Under a representation reinfOrcing scheme, substantive outcomes may be overturned only if
the democratic process cannot be trusted. Ely, Toward a Representation-Reinforcing Mode of Judicial
Review, 37 NlICat. L. REV. 451. 486 (1978). See also J. FAN, supra note 30.
41 One commentator has stated: "011ie Act's essential role was mainly procedural and not
substantive: to protect the process by which these governing mechanisms were developed and
administered and to prohibit practices which would undermine or defeat it. - Feller, supra note 27, at
100. See also Cox, The Role of the Law, supra note 29, at 606.
42 Cf. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974) (employee rights affecting the
selection of a bargaining representative cannot he waived by a union).
" Section 8(a)(3), for exatnple, is not designed primarily to protect worker freedom and dignity
by prohibiting employment decisions based on factors u nrelated to merit or productivity. Cf. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
.14 Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957);
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956).
" NLRB v. Magnavox Company of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974), NLRB v. Mid-
States Metal Products, inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704-06 (5th Cir. 1968).
" NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. at 325- 26; Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. at 280;
NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products inc., 403 F.2d at 704-06.
47 Compare the NLRA model with the Civil Rights Act of 1964,,supra note 43. The Civil Rights Act
established intrinsic rights against certain types of employment discrimination. The rights cannot be
prospectively waived. Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). See also Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (no prospective waiver of judicial trial and review under the Securities Act
of 1933).
" For a criticism of this aspect of the NLRA model, see Klare, historiography, supra note 27, at
475-78; Lyttd, Covernaera Without Rights: The labo r Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INI)us. REL. 483,
483-93 (1981). This article focuses on the NLRA model's procedure for establishing rules, but it
should be noted that there were also threats to the autonomy of the judicial branch of the NLRA
model. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976), for example, created federal
court jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining agreements. To the extent the section could be
used to substitute federal court litigation for arbitrancm, the state (through judicial interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements) would play an ever-expanding role in governing the workplace
and the autonomous system envisioned by the NLRA model would be undercut. This challenge was
met by arguing for an interpretation of section 301 that would both limit the role of courts and
reaffirm the predominance of arbitration as the method for resolving contract disputes. Cox,
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The NLRA model of industrial democracy, in sum, was based on republicanism.
Representatives of capital and labor establish rules that govern the work place. Even as
articulated by the post-war liberals, though, the model remained but an outline. Propo-
nents spoke in vague and general terms,' 9 but the difficult questions of democratic
theory.'" were certainly not answered and, to a large extent, were not even asked. Over
time, however, the outline has become a manuscript. The questions have been asked and
answered, not by the post-war theorists, but by decisions in concrete cases.
II. THE NI...RA NlonEt. Exi.1.1cA•ED
A. Issues
Every political system, including the "industrial democracy" established by the
NLRA, consists of procedures for establishing substantive rules, the substantive rules
themselves, and procedures for determining the applicability of substantive rules to
particular situations."' The NLRA model and this article are primarily concerned with the
procedures for establishing substantive rules. Employers and employees both participate
in a process of establishing rules for the governance of the enterprise. It was clear from
the beginning that the NLRA model was not intended to establish the substantive rules
themselves:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected
their representatives, all the [Wagner Act] proposes to do is to escort them to
the door of their employer and say "Here they are, the legal representatives
of your employees." What happens behind those doors is not inquired into
and the bill does no seek to inquire into it. 32
Reflections, supra note 26 at 1507.18; Cox, Current Problems, supra note 27, at 258-66. See also, Bickel &
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 FIARV. L. REV. 1,
24-25 (1957). The Steelworkers Trilogy adopted just such an interpretation of section 301. Under the
Steelworkers Trilogy, the courts were extremely limited in their ability to resolve disputes prior to
arbitration and in their ability to review the decisions of arbitrators. Prior to arbitration, judicial
inquiry was limited to whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate the dispute. If they had, the matter
was to be referred to arbitration. If there were doubts about whether the parties had agreed to
arbitrate, they "should be resolved in favor of [arbitration]." United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). See also United Steelworkers of America
v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960). In reviewing arbitration awards, the
courts were to enforce awards if drew their "essence from the collective bargaining agreement."
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960), An
arbitration award should be enforced even if the arbitrator does not issue an opinion and even if
there is ambiguity about the basis for the award. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 598. The primary
function of the courts under section 301, then, was to enforce arbitration decisions. Thus, section 301
"served simply to enforce compliance with the system of self- government." Feller, supra note 27, at
106.
49 The effect of the vague metaphors was often heightened by repetition. See, e.g., Cox &
Dunlop, supra note 28, at 421 ("[t]o alter the figure, the divine right of kings has yielded to a
constitutional monarchy in which there is a large measure of industrial democracy"); Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 liARV. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Cox, Duty to Bargain]
("to change the figure, the divine right of the king must yield to a constitutional monarchy, in winch a
large measure of industrial democracy will prevail"). See Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy and
the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectives from Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61 OR. L. Rev. 157, 165
(1982),
" See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
j. DUNLOP, supra note 6, at 13.
82
 79 CONG. REC. 7660 (daily ed. May 16, 1935) (statement of Sen. Walsh), This quotation was
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The substantive rules were to be established by private bargaining under the pro-
cedu•al rules established by the Act" The NLRA model does provide procedures for
determining the applicability of substantive rules to particular situations..'' These proce-
dures are an important aspect of the governance system created by the NLRA model, and
they present significant. problems." This article, however, will focus on the procedures for
establishing rules and on the legislative aspects of the model.
In evaluate a model of industrial democracy, one must first define the elements of a
democracy and then articulate the major issues that any model of democracy must
address. No single definition of democracy exists. The definitional issue has divided
generations of political scientists. Most definitions, however, contain certain elements to
which we can compare the NLRA model of industrial democracy. A democracy, it is
agreed, is a system for governing." The authority to govern resides in a representative
body selected for limited iernis by the electorate:" The electorate is defined broadly to
include most or all of those governed• who are competently to exercise voting rights. The
votes of electors have approximately the same weight in affecting governance decisions.'"
This parity in weight given to votes means both that the votes of electors have the same
weight in selecting representatives and. that the votes of representatives, assuming
similarly-sized constituencies, have the same weight in establishing policy."I Certain liber-
ties (for example, freedom to present alternative policies and to vote free of coercion or
intimidation) are protected to ensure proper functioning of the system," 2 but, except for
these essential liberties. democracy is neutral on outcomes."' And, filially, the principle of
used often by the major proponents of the NLRA model. See,e.g., Cox, Duty to Bargain ,supra note 49,
at 1402; Cox, Government Regulation of the Negotiation and Terms of Collective Agreement: An Address, 101
U. PA. L. REV, 1137, 1137 (1953).
• H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1970). See Feller, supra note 27, at 106; Cox,
Concerted Activities, supra note 28, at 322-23.
" Labor arbitration is the process for applying rules to particular situations. See supra note 48.
▪ Proponents of the NLRA model spilled much ink on the arbitration process. See, e.g., Stone,
supra note 8, at 1523-31, 1559-65.
• D. PICKLES, DEMOCRACY 13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1). PICKLES]; RANNEY & KENDALL,
BASIC: PRINCIPLES FOR A MODEL. Or: DEMOCRACY IN EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC, THEORY 47 (C. Cnuchle &
1). Neubauer, eds., 1969) [hereinafter cited as RANNEY & KENDALL].
' T J. RAwr.s, A TilkloRy or jusTier 222 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ]. RAwLs1: J. PLAmEsu•rz,
DEMOCRACY AND lti.ListoN 184-85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as J. PLAsIENArz]: DAHL & LINDBLOM,
POI:YAM:HY IN FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 55-57 (H. Kariel, ed., 1970) [hereinafter cited as
DAm, & Lisann.om]; D. PICKLES, supra note 56, at 13.
• See Eliot - malt & Pitogoir, The Democratic Corporation: The New Worker Cooperative Statute in
Massachusetts, I 1 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 460-61 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Eller]nan &
Pitegoff').
Thus, minors and the insane may be excluded from the electorate. [• RAWLS, .copra note 57, at
222.
bO . RAWLS, SUpra note 57, at 223; DAHL & LINDBLOM, Supra note 57. at 56; RANNEY & KENDALL,
supra note 5t1, at 49.
61 J. Rawt_s, supra note 57, at 223.
62 Id. at 224-27; J. PLAM•NATZ, supra note 57, at 188; C. FRANKEL, THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT
167-68 (1962) [hereinafter cited as C. FRANKEL].
• See J. ELY, supra note 30, at 87, 101. Neutrality on substantive issues is also a central premise of
the NLRA model. See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680-81 (1981)
("['I -]he Act is not intended to serve either party's individual interest, but to foster in a neutral
manner a system in which the conflict between these interests may be resolved"); H.K. Porter Co. v.
NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970) ("It is implicit in the entire structure of the Act that the Board acts
to oversee and referee the process of collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the
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majority rule is accepted as the arbiter of conflict"' so that iCSOrt to force is not necessary."'"
Every democracy, then, including industrial democracy under the N LRA model,
must answer at least three questions. First, who is allowed to participate in the process?
Mm-e narrowly, who can vote and what is the rationale for depriving certain groups of the
right to vote? Second, how does the process weigh the votes? How are the votes of electors
weighed and how are the votes of elected representatives weighed? Third, what lim-
itations are placed on the process or its outcomes or both?" This article will parse the
NLRA model by exploring the answers it gives to these essential questions.
B. Who Votes?
The right to vole is the quintessential right"' in any democracy. Thus, the issue of who
participates in the system "is a question that. must. precede any inquiry into the fairness of
the process itself. -"' The question is often not an easy one to answer. Four amendments to
the United States Constitution have been required to answer "who votes" questions,'''' but
the issue has by no means been resolved.'" Similarly, voting rights for economic strikers
under the National Labor Relations Act have been granted,?' and revoked,?' and granted
anew. 73
The National Labor Relations Act establishes a representative democracy for resolv-
ing labor relations issues. Representatives of labor and management must meet and
bargain in good faith about the terms and conditions of employment?' The "who votes"
issues under the Act concern the procedures for selecting these representatives. The Act
provides a complex election procedure" and protects employees from employer interfer-
ence in the selection of their representatives.?"
In representation elections, employees vote to select the organization to represent
them. If the employees vote against union representation, the industrial democracy
bargaining strengths of the parties."). See also A. Cox, D. Box 8c R. GORMAN, supra note 23, at 83-84;
Note, Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Act ,.96 Hmtv. L. REV. 1662, 1676 (1983).
See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-34 (1956).
I). PICKLES, supra note 56, at 23; R. M. MAcivER, THE ROLE OE THE. PEOPLE IN BASIC ISSUES Or
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 18 (6th ed. 1970); C. FRANKEL, supra note 62 • at 167.
66 See Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Hawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEN.
L. REV. 1029, 1043 (1980); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1071-72 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Tribe].
67Tribe, supra note 66, a; 1071.
en Id.
69 U.S. CONS". amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
7 '1 See, e.g., Holt. Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75 (1978) (nonresidents not
entitled to vote even though jurisdiction taxes and regulates them); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski,
399 U.S. 204, 214-15 (1970) (franchise cannot be limited to property owners). See generally Rosberg,
Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 Mical. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
11 See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 490, 491 (1945); The Rudolph Wurlitzer Co.,
32 N.L.R.B. 163, 166 (1941).
T Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 101, § 101, 61 Stat. 135, 144 (1947), amended by Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 702, 73 Stat. 519, 542 (1959).
NLRA, § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976).
" NLRA, §§ 8(a)(5), 8(1)1(3), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 158(d) (1976).
NLRA, § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976): 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.17-101.30 (1983). See generally C.
MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 309-549 (2d ed. 1983)[hereinafter cited as C. MORRIS]; El.
WELLINGTON, supra note 2, at 45.
78 NLRA, §§ 8(0 1), 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(2), 158(a)(3) (1976).
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aspects of the NLRA model collapse. Indeed, if the employees vote against representa-
tion, the NLRA severely limits employer attempts to introduce democracy in the absence
of a union. Employer efforts, for example, to establish employee advisory committees
may run afoul of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act." Employees who vote against union represen-
tation, then, have chosen employer autocracy over democracy. The ability of employees to
make this choice under the NLRA is comparable to the federal government allowing the
citizens of a state to adopt a monarchical form of state government. Thus, the NLRA
model, unlike the political model in this country," does not require a democratic form of
industrial government, it merely permits such a form. The initial question posed in
representation elections, then, is whether a democratic form should be adopted.
Not all employees" are entitled to vote in representation elections. The Act explicitly
excludes supervisors from its coverage." Thus, if a company hires a person to manage a
portion of the business and that person has the authority "to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees, or responsi-
bly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such
action," 81 that supervisor would be unable to vote in a Board representation election and,
indeed, is not entitled to participate in any way in the NLRA governance model.
Managerial and confidential employees are also ineligible to vote in representation
elections. Managerial employees are employees who "formulate and effectuate manage-
ment policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer,""
Managerial employees, then, are more closely aligned with capitals and should be rep-
resented by the management side in the NLRA procedure. Confidential employees are
employees who "assist and act in a confidential capacity to [managerial employees]." 64 An
executive secretary to a company's labor relations director would be a confidential em-
ployee. Confidential employees are not directly represented by management in the NLRA
model (they are not managers), but they cannot be represented by unions. They are
disenfranchised. Even if employees vote in favor of union representation, then, the
NLRA model at its base may fail to satisfy an essential element of democracy. The model
may not provide representation to all or most of those governed."
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Thompson
Ramo 'Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203
(1959). Rut see Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
" See U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4.
" The term "employee" is used here in a non-technical sense.
" NLRA, §§ 2(3), 2(11), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11) (1976).
mi NLRA, § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1976).
" Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning, 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4 (1947). See Ford Motor Co., 66
N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946).
63
 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, '285 - 89 (1974); American Locomotive Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 115, 116-17 (1950); In re Demon's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35, 37 (1949).
The B.F. Goodrich Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956). See also Kleinherg, Kaplan, Wolff,
Cohen & Burrows, P.C., 253 N.L.R.B. 450,450-51 (1980); Air Express Intl Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 478
(1979): In re Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1946). Accord NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural
Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981),
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. If the number of managerial and supervisory
personnel compared to other personnel is relatively small and the rationale for excluding them from
participation is accepted, this element of democracy may be satisfied. If, however, the relative
number of' managerial and supervisory personnel is large or the rationale for exclusion is not
accepted, this element of democracy may not be satisfied. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444
U.S. 672 (1980) (faculty members are managerial employees and, hence, do not fall within the NLRA
governance model).
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If employees do vote for a union to represent them, the NLRA model provides
protections to ensure that a democratic process is used to select the leaders of that union,"
The model provides for periodic elections of leaders at both the local and national levels."'
These elections must be by secret ballot," the nomination process must be open," voter
coercion is prohihited 9° and free speech and assembly rights are protected. 9 ' These
carefully worded guarantees have often been swept aside and many union organizations
tend to oligarchy.92 Nevertheless, the guarantees generally meet the formal requirements
of democratic process" and express a public policy of democratization at least on the issue
of selection of union leaders." That is, the model is democratic, even if reality sometimes
strays.
The NLRA model does not address the selection procedure for the other representa-
tive in the process — the management representative. The Act only provides that labor
organizations may not restrain or coerce management in its selection of a representative.92
Affirmative guarantees of democratic selection are absent. The disparity in selection
procedures for union and management representatives has not gone unnoticed by labor
leaders. William Winpisinger, head of the International Association of Machinists, has
recently complained that "[t]here are no democratic controls [on management]. Every-
thing else has democratic controls on it, including statutory controls to democratize labor.
But there are none on capital, not a damn one." 96
Even without statutory guarantees, however, does a rough form of democracy exist
in the selection of management representatives? Corporations have shareholders who
meet periodically to select managers who select representatives for labor negotiations.
This process is very rough democracy, if it is democracy at all. Shareholder votes are not
weighed equally and, perhaps, they should not be. But because they are not equally
weighed, the label democracy does not describe the process."' Moreover, the management
representatives must represent managerial and confidential employees. These employees
are not represented by unions because of their close relationship with management." But
" Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976).
"Id. at § 481.
" 9 Id. at §§ 481(a) & (h).
"" Id. at § 481(e).
9° Id.
9 ' Id. at § 411(a)(2).
9' See generally S. LipsET, POLITICAL MAN THE SOCIAL. BASIS or POLITICS 387-433 (1981); S.
LIPSET, M. TROW, & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL.
FYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 3-13 (1956).
"a See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
94 On other issues, such as democracy in collective bargaining, unions may not fare as well. See
generally Hyde, supra note 8.
NLRA, § 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (1976).
" Brody & Donlan, Labor's Last Angry Man, Barron's, Jan. 30, 1984, at 26, col, 5 (interview with
William Winpisinger).
" See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. This criticism may be unfair. In a situation
where persons have differing interests in the entity to be governed, it may not be democratic to weigh
all votes equally. Or, conversely, in such a situation it may be democratic to weigh votes unequally. Cf.
Baker, Counting Preference in Collective Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. REV. 381, 393 - 413 (1978)
(discusses situations in which certain voter preferences should not be counted). To weigh share-
holder votes unequally solely on the basis of shares held, however, assumes that shareholder interest
in an entity can be fairly judged solely on that basis. Moreover, even if weighing shareholder votes
unequally does not undermine democracy claims, other factors do. See infra notes 98-101 and
accompanying text.
9 ' See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. See also Derber, Industrial Democracy as an
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these employees, of course, have no formal voice in the selection of management's
representative. In addition, even if these employees did have formal voting rights, they
lack the basic liberties necessary to ensure free exercise of these rights. 99 For example, the
employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer to fire or discipline managers or
confidential employees who attempt to forward a certain representative or to articulate
certain policy positions:"") the NLRA model provides few protections for these employ-
ees."
Finally, even if management representatives were democratically selected, one may
question management's right to participate in the process. Democratic theory authorizes
those governed to vole.'"2 Thus, labor's right to participate is firmly based. Owners or
stockholders, however, are not among "those governed." Their right to participate may,
be based on their property interests in the enterprise, but property interests as a basis for
voting rights have beers long rejected by democratic theory. 1 " 3 Alternatively, the "vote" of
management may be justified on the theory that anyone affected by the decisions of a
government should have the right to participate in that government.'" But that rationale
is too broad-reaching; under such a theory, because Canadians are affected by United
States government decisions on acid rain, Canadians would have the right to vote in
United States' elections. Thus, the very existence of a management "vote" under the
NLRA challenges the democracy model of the Act.
On the issue of "who votes?", then, the NLRA model permits half a democracy. The
model merely "permits" a democracy because if employees vote against union representa-
tion in the first instance, the democracy model collapses. If' employees vote for union
representation, half a democracy results. The model attempts to ensure democratically
elected union representatives, but makes no attempt to ensure democratically elected
management representatives.
C. How Are Votes Weighed?
The National Labor Relations Act establishes a representative democracy. Capital
and labor are each entitled to one representative,'" each representative having one vote.
Organizing Concept fIJr a l'heary	 Relations, ESSAYS IN INinisTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY 180
(G. Somers, CIL, 1969) (political analogy does not apply to selection of top management).
"" See supra note 62 and accoinpanying text.
'"" The employment- at - will doctrine permits employers io discharge employees for any reason
or for no reason at all See, e.g., Alford v. Life Savers, inc., 210 Neb. 441, 442, 315 N.W.2d 260, 261
(1982); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Purer v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 393, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589.90 (1967); Odell v. Hunthle Oil & Ref. Co., 201
l',2d 123, 123 (10th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953); Hutton v. Wafters, 132 Tenn. 527,
179 S.W. 134 (1915). See generally Blades, Employment At Will vs, Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLuNt. L. Rev. 1404 (1967): Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Agairut Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. I... REV. 1816 (1980);
Comment. The Employment At Will Role, 31 ALA. L. REV. 421 (1980),
'°' See Parker-Robb Chevrolet, inc. 262 N.L.R.B. 402, 402-04 (1982). See generally Bethel, The
NLRB and the Discharge of Supervisors: Parker-Robb Brings Questionable Reform, 54 U. Coto. L. REV. 1
(19821-
I" See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
193
 1 MORRISON & CONIMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 468, 507 (4th ed.
1951).
104
 Ellerman & Pitegolf, supra note 58, at 469-61. See A. Cox, supra note 23, at 93; R. DAnt.,
AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 64 (1970).
105
 Or one set of representatives.
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The representatives, in theory,m6 occupy co-equal bargaining positions: each is required
to bargain with the other"' and each must sign the collective bargaining agreement
negotiated.'" Thus, the Act views capital and labor as equal. Both sides receive one vote
under the Act"'' regardless of the capital- or labor-intensiveness of the industry involved,
regardless of pre-existing labor conditions, regardless of the value of the capital or labor
to those supplying it to the entity — regardless of anything. This procedure, naturally,
results in a high frequency of tie votes.
Alternative vote-weighting schemes would have resulted in fewer tie votes. The
National Labor Relations Act, for example, could have counted only the votes of capital''
or labor. Alternatively, the Act could have assigned a voting-weight. to each unit of capital
and each unit of labor and resolved disputes based on such a weighted voting scheme.
Such schemes, though, would remove the putative outcome neutrality of democracy and
of the NLRA model."' Determining- whether to count the votes of capital or labor or
determining the voting-value of labor versus the voting-value of capital would require
governmental decisions on the value of each. Thus, the state would be required, in
making these weighting decisions, to elevate its values" above the values that might
emerge through a more neutral process.
The National Labor Relations Act resolves this conflict between a high frequency of tie .
votes and the value imposition"' implicit in a procedure that would avoid tie votes, by
invoking a "neutral" dispute resolution mechanism. The Act. permits resort to economic
weapons — primarily the strike, lockout and boycott — to resolve tie votes. This type of
resolution is neither peaceful nor deliberate. Terms used to describe the tie-breaking
mechanism make this clear: the parties use "economic weapons" to engage in "economic
warfare."
The reaction against value imposition that resulted in the Act's tic-breaking mecha-
nism is also a reaction against industrial democracy. The votes of representatives may not
have the same weight in establishing policy."' Rather, if skilled labor needed by an
employer is short and the employer's product is in great but seasonal demand, the "votes"
of labor may be weighted very heavily. Or if laborers are plentiful and the employer has
large stockpiles of his product, the "votes" of management may be weighted very heavily.
These examples, of course, grossly oversimplify bargaining dynamics, but the central
point is clear: the NLRA's tie-breaking mechanism undermines any claim to equal weight-
ing of votes. The Act's tie-breaking mechanism also undermines industrial democracy
because it is not a peaceful or orderly procedure for resolving disputes. In a democracy,
theorists agree, the principle of majority rule is accepted as the arbiter of conflict so that
t" See Stone, supra note 8, at 1577-80.
NLRA. §§ R(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1976).
NLRA. § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
'ft More specifically, an employer receives one vote vis-a-vis each bargaining unit. This results in
a greater number of potential tie votes (several per employer rather than one per employer): divides
employees into more manageable groups; and requires jurisdictional decisions that limit union
influence. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
"° This is, in effect, the result when employees vote against union representation. See supra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
"' See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
12 More specifically, the state would impose its valuations of the relative value of capital and
labor.
"3 See J. ELY, supra note 30, at 73 (value imposition ought to he avoided under United States
Constitution).
" 4 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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resort to force is not necessary."' The majority rule principle is not an element of the
NLRA model. Instead, disputes are resolved in a manner closer to the state of nature —
the more powerful rule.
The resort to economic warfare as a tie-breaking mechanism, although in conflict
with the goal of industrial democracy, resolved other policy problems. First, it permitted
the state to maintain a position of nonintervention and, second, it allowed consumers,
investors and the public at large to participate its the negotiation process. This second
point deserves clarification. Through the NLRA, the state chose a moderate course of
public, that is, non-employer and non-employee, intervention in labor relations. At one
extreme, the state could have acted to set wages, hours and terms and conditions of
employment. The public, then, would have controlled labor relations. At the other
extreme, the state could have acted with the goal of separating labor relations and the
state by, for example, empowering employers and employees to set wages, hours and
working conditions and requiring private binding arbitration of disputes." 7 The NLRA
took a middle route by empowering employers and unions to establish wages, hours and
working conditions, but permitting either party to, in effect, take disputes to the public.
The boycott weapon is most obviously an appeal to the public for a favorable resolution of
a labor dispute,'" but the outcomes of strikes and lockouts also depend heavily on
consumer, investor, and other public reaction.
In suns, the votes of labor and capital are formally equal. Each receives one vote. But
the NLRA model is designed to create a large number of tie votes and, when tie votes
occur, any claim to real vote equality disappears. In addition, tie votes create other
conflicts with fundamental democratic notions, such as the majority rule principle and the
rejection of force.
I). Outcome Limitations
A consideration of ou tcome limitations is essential to an evaluation of any democracy.
In a democracy, the authority to govern must reside in the electorate or in a representa-
tive body.'" If there are severe limitations on the ability of the representative body to act,
the authority resides elsewhere. Thus, a governance system that meets all of the requisites
of a democracy, except that the representative body has only the authority to make
recommendations to the Queen, is not a democracy; the authority to govern resides in the
Queen. At the same time, liberal democratic theory recognizes the need for some out-
come limitations to ensure, at the least, adequate functioning of the process.' 2° Conse-
quently, limitations on the ability of the representative body to disenfranchise minority
groups or parties are necessary.' 2 ' These types of outcome limitations do not undermine a
democracy; they preserve it.
Three basic types of outcome limitations are present in the NLRA model. One type
lls See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
'" Some have argued that the NLRA model ought to approach this end of the continuum. See,
e.g., Shulman, supra note 27.
'" Cf. Harper, The Consumer's Emerging Right to Boycott: NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware and Its
Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J. 409, 421-26 (1984) (discusses the boycott as political
action).
" 9 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
121
 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 309 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally J. ELY,
supra note 30.
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has already been mentioned.''" The Act directly prohibits certain results. Thus, a contrac-
tual provision requiring an employer to hire only union members is prohibited even if the
union and employer involved agree to the provision.'" A second type of' outcome
limitation establishes the outer boundaries of the democracy. The Act's processes need
only be followed with respect to employee wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment.' 2-' This outcome limitation establishes the scope of the sovereignty
created by the Act. The third type of outcome limitation is less direct. The Act restricts the
means parties can use to achieve certain outcomes. Thus, employers cannot legally fire
economic strikers'''' and employees cannot legally engage in sitdown strikes to achieve
favorable outcomes.'" These three types of outcome limitations require separate consid-
eration.
The Act's direct outcome limitations present a serious threat. to democratic claims.'"
Even if labor and management representatives reach agreement, the Act prohibits closed
shop'" and hot cargo clauses, 11" clauses that require payment for services which are not to
be performed,'" and certain limitations on solicitation and distribution rights."' The
argument can be made that some, but not all, of these outcome limitations are justified as
attempts to preserve the democratic process. To the extent a collective bargaining agree-
ment infringes on the right of employees freely to choose a bargaining representative, the
agreement may be struck down. Thus, in National Labor Relations Board v. Magnavox Co. ,"2
the Supreme Court invalidated provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. which
limited the solicitation and distribution rights of unions and which, therefore, infringed
on the employees' ability freely to choose a representative." Similarly, hot cargo agree-
122 See supra notes 36- 48 and accompanying text.
"3 NLRA, §§ 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.G. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(6)(2) (1976).
124 NLRA, §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.G. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1976). See First National Maintenance Corp.
v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-80 (1981); Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 164 (1971); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,
209-11 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348 (1958).
1 " See, e.g., NLRB v. Intl Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48, 52 (1972); NLRB v. United States Cold
Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).
'' See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 473-76 (1940); Cone Mills Corp. v. NLRB, 413
F.2d 445, 454 (4th Cir. 1969); Peck, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1179-81 (1976). But see Overhead Door
Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 431, 431 - 32 (1975), enforcement denied in part, 540 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1976).
'n See also supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
'" NLRA, §§ 8(a)(3), 8(6)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(h)(2) (1976). A dosed shop clause
would provide that only members of the.union may be used by the employer.
129 NLRA, §§ 8(e), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The term "hot cargo" generally refers to
products of plants employing non-union workers, strikebreakers or other workers considered hostile
by the union. An employer accepting a hot cargo clause would agree not to require his employees to
handle hot cargo. See Teamsters Local 728 (Brown Transportation Co.), 140 N.L.R.B. 1436, 1438
(1963), enforced in part sub. nom., Teamsters Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964); Teamsters Local 210 (American Feed Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 214,
215-16 (1961).
'" NLRA, § 8(b)(6), 29	 § 158(6)(6) (1976). See Teamsters Local 456 (J.R. Stevenson
Corp.), 212 N.L.R.B. 968, 969-71 (1974); Lathers Local 46 (Expanded Metals Engineer Co.), 207
N.L.R.B. 631, 635-37 (1973).
' 31 See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-27 (1974). See generally Note, Labor Law:
Employee's Solicitation-Distribution Rights Supersede Contract Waiver, 26 U. FLA. L. Rev. 908 (1974);
Comment, Protecting Employee Solicitation-Distribution Rights from Union Waiver, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
571 (1976).
132 415 U.S. 322, 325-27 (1974).
131 See also NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 704-06 (5th Cir. 1968).
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limits and closed shop clauses may be viewed as antithetical to the NLRA's democratic
processes. Hot cargo agreements may encourage boycotted employers to interfere with
the free choice of their etnployees 13' and closed shop agreements may be viewed as
improper attempts to influence the composition of the electorate.' 35
This justification, however, is insufficient to preserve the model's claim to democratic
processes. First, the justification does not explain all of the Act's outcome limitations. The
limitation on payments for services not to be performed does not further the Act's
processes in any way analogous to the solicitation and distribution limitations in Mag-
navox. Moreover, the process-oriented interpretation of the hot cargo and closed shop
limitations is grossly inadequate; the limitations can be understood only by reference to
substantive values other than process reinforcement. 13" Second, the justification does not.
adequately explain why some outcomes are prohibited, while others are not.' 3 ' To protect
the significant process right of selecting bargaining representatives, certain limitations on
solicitation and distribution rights are prohibited.' 38 But the right to strike is also a
significant process right — it is one of the major tie-breaking mechanisms available under
the Act.' 33
 Yet limitations on the right to strike are not prohibited."' Third, the justifica-
tion violates the desired value neutrality of the NLRA model. If hot cargo agreements are
to be prohibited because they may encourage boycotted employers to coerce employees,
should union-organized consumer boycotts be prohibited? Should organizational pickets
or organizational handouts be prohibited as well? To make these choices, appeal must be
made to more than democratic channel-clearing; at the least, the calculus must also
include free speech and economic freedom values.
The second type of outcome limitation is jurisdictional in nature. The Act's processes
need only be followed with respect to employee wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of:employment."' If a subject of bargaining does not fit within these terms, the
party in control of the matter can simply refuse to bargain, the other party cannot "insist'
upon a certain disposition of the matter,'" and, hence, the party in control can avoid the
NLRA process. This jurisdictional limitation excludes major and important issues from
NLRA processes. In First National Maintenance Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Board,'" for example, an employer's decision to discontinue a portion of its business was
134 See Lesnick, job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach cf NLRA	 8(h)(4) and 8(e), 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 1000, 1004-06, 1015-18 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Lesnick]; Comment, A Rational
Approach to Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1280, 1287- 89, 1299- 1300 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Secondary Boycotts].
13' See Rosenthal, The National Labor Relations Act and Compulsory Unionism, 1954 1.4`is. L. RES'. 53,
56-57 (1954) (hereinafter cited as Rosenthal).
'36
	 Lesnick, supra note 134; Rosenthal, supra note 135; Comment, Secondary Boycotts, supra
note 1.34.
137
	Klare, Historiography, supra note 26, at 475-77.
138 See ,supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
1 " See supra notes 105 - 13 and accompanying text.
140
 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957); Mastro Plastics Corp.•v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 280 (1956). Indeed, the law makes waiver of the right to strike quite easy.
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962).
'1 ' See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
"' NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); NLRB v. South
Atlantic and Gulf Coast Longshoremen, 443 F.2d 218, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Hod Carriers
Local 1082, 384 F.2d 55, 56-57 (9th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 78 L.R.R.M. 2260 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968); NLRB v. American Compress Warehouse, 350 F.2d 365, 368- 70 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S, 982 (1966).
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 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
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held to be outside the scope of the NLRA process. As a result, the employer was entitled
to act unilaterally.'°
Jurisdictional limitations by themselves do not undermine democracy claims. Any
regime with overlapping democracies must have jurisdictional rules. In the United States,
for example, federal and state power overlaps. The Constitution imposes jurisdictional
limitations on the federal Congress," gives federal law supremacy over state law, 16 and
reserves authority beyond the jurisdiction of the Congress to the states."' Analogatis
overlapping democracies are contemplated in the NLRA model. For example, a corpora-
tion may have employees in three different bargaining units. The NLRA's jurisdictional
rules do not undermine democracy claims when they operate to minimize conflicts
between the bargaining units. Thus, each unit may participate in the NLRA process with
respect to the wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment of that unit's
employees. But if the corporation is considering whether to close the plant, none of the
bargaining units have a right to participate.j 4" Instead, the NLRA's jurisdictional rules
confer the power to make that decision on the employer, one of many interested groups.
This operation of the jurisdictional rules challenges democracy claims. The rules in this
circumstance do not allocate decision-making power to one of two or more democratic
entities (for example, to Congress or to a state legislature). Rather, the rules confer some
of the power to govern on a non-democratic group — on managers or unions as the case
may he. It is as if the Constitution reserved certain subjects, not for other democratic
forums (the states), but for the Republican Party." 9
The third type of outcome limitation restricts the means parties may use to achieve
outcomes. As noted previously,"' employees cannot legally engage in sitdown strikes to
achieve favorable outcomes.•' Every democracy imposes analogous outcome limitations.
Firebombing to achieve a political end is not permissible in any democratic system of
which I ant aware.
Outcome limitations in the NLRA model, however, have a special significance. Other
democracies impose this type of outcome limitation to achieve the more peaceful vote-
counting method of resolving issues. The NLRA model, in contrast, does not provide a
peaceful vote-counting procedure for resolving disputes.' 32 Rather, the model con-
templates reliance on "economic warfare." When the model restricts the weapons avail-
able to the parties, it is not merely bolstering peaceful vote-counting; rather, it is altering
the vote-weighting scheme of the NLRA model. The model cannot simultaneously re-
main neutral (as democracy demands)' 53 and alter the weight-voting scheme. Hence, the
"4 For other issues that have been classified as permissive and which, as a result, may he
excluded from NLRA processes, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 523-29 (1976); C. Momus, supra note 75, at 845-63.
U.S. CoNs.r. art. I, § 8.
146 U.S. Coss.r. art. VI.
"T U.S. CONS•, amend. X.
14' See First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981).
19 The Supreme Court recognized the effect of its decision on the NLRA model: "Nile elected
union representative [is not] an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the
union's members are employed." Id. at 676.
1." See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
1 " These, of course, are only examples of the many and varied restrictions on means imposed
by the NLRA model.
15` See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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outcome limitations of the NLRA model present serious challenges to its claim to democ-
racy.
CONCLUSION
Industrial democracy is not a phrase that accurately describes the NLRA model. The
model fails as democracy' in virtually every way. Not all those governed may vote,
although many not governed may. Some representatives are democratically elected, but
others are not.. The votes of representatives are not weighed equally or in a peaceful
manner. The model is constrained by outcome limitations that are not justifiable.
Nevertheless, the industrial democracy rhetoric continues. This would be unimpor-
tant if the rhetoric did not affect the development of labor law. But it does. The effect of
the rhetoric is lo hinder progressive change. The rhetoric itself legitimizes, and hence
renders more resistant to change, the labor relations status quo. The status quo, the
rhetoric tells us, is the result of a democratic process; thus, all participants in the process
are responsible for the status quo and those who argue for change outside of that process
(for example, through government intervention) argue against democracy.''' The
rhetoric also tends to remove labor issues from broader public debate. Such issues, the
argument goes, are better left to the private "democratic" processes of the NLRA. This
rationale not only sequesters labor issues from related political and moral choices,'''" but it
also fragments common labor problems and, hence, the political power of workers.'''
Any new approach to labor relations must begin with a new and more accurate
description of the industrial world.'" The "industrial democracy" description has failed.
It posits an industrial world in which labor relations is isolated from the broader political
process and in which the state is neutral on labor relations issues. But that is not the world
in which we live. The new description should begin with precisely the opposite assump-
tions— that the broader political process and labor relations are intimately connected and
that the state has interests in labor relations that may differ significantly front the interests
of management and labor. The central labor relations issue would then shift from the
issue of whether the state should intervene'" to productive discussion on the appropriate
nature of state intervention. Only then would the battle cry "industrial democracy -
 take on
new life. But. it would not be an industrial democracy sapped of its vitality by artificial
insulation from the broader political democracy. instead, it would he industrial policy
through the broader political democracy.
Im Cox, Preserving Union Democracy, supra note 25, at 610; Feller, supra note 27, at 764-66.
L" Cf. Singer,
 ,The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis.
L. REV. 975, 1059 (1982) ("The logic.of rights [in this context, the bargaining rights of labor would be
an example] is a human invention whose purpose is to preserve us from the notion that we must
make political and moral choices.").
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 On a more personal level, the rhetoric may provide a "fantasy image of community," which
may compensate to some extent for the alienation experienced by many workers, but which may also
divert the energies needed for a more meaningful solution. Gabel & Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and The Practice of Law, 11 N.V.U. Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369,
372 (1983).
"7 See Stone, supra note 8, at 1580. See also H. WELLINGTON, Slipra note 2, at 158-63 (industrial
democracy metaphor is misleading).
''" See Mare, Historiography, supra note 27, at 480-82.
